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Proportionality under
International Humanitarian Law:
The "Reasonable Military
Commander" Standard and
Reverberating Effects
Ian Henderson & Kate Reece*
ABSTRACT

The principle of proportionality protects civilians and civilian
objects against expected incidental harm from an attack that is
excessive to the military advantage anticipated from the attack.
However, despite its status as a fundamental norm of international
humanitarianlaw (IHL), key terms are not defined in relevant treaties
nor do they benefit from criticaljudicial explanation. This has caused
challenges for both academics and military commanders alike in
explaining and applying the test for proportionality.
The Article expands upon two points that were raised and
generated interesting discussion at The Second Israel Defense Forces
International Conference on the Law of Armed Conflict during a panel
that dealt with contemporaryissues in proportionality. Those two issues
are:
a.

What does the "reasonablemilitary commander" standardfor
assessingproportionalityentail?

b.

Should "reverberatingeffects" (i.e., collateraleffects that are
only expected to materialize in the long term) be accounted for
as part of the assessment of collateral damage?

Ian Henderson is an Adjunct Associate Professor at the University of Adelaide
Law School, and both authors are legal officers in the Royal Australian Air Force. This
Article was written in the authors' personal capacities and does not necessarily represent
the views of the Australian Government or the Australian Department of Defence.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Article is to expand on two points that were
raised and generated interesting discussion at The Second Israel
Defense Forces InternationalConference on the Law of Armed Conflict
during a panel that dealt with contemporary issues in proportionality.'
Those two issues are:
a.

What does the "reasonable military commander" standard for
assessing proportionality entail?

b.

Should "reverberating effects" (i.e., collateral effects that are
only expected to materialize in the long term) be accounted for
as part of the assessment of collateral damage?

The principle of proportionality protects civilians and civilian
objects against expected incidental harm from an attack that is
excessive to the military advantage anticipated from the attack.
Military commanders are prohibited from planning or executing such
indiscriminate attacks. The principle of proportionality is accepted as
a norm of customary international law applicable in both international
and noninternational armed conflict. 2 The test for proportionality has
been codified in Additional Protocol I. The relevant provisions of
Additional Protocol I prohibit attacks that: "may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation

1.
For a comprehensive discussion on proportionality in international law, see
generally MICHAEL NEWTON & LARRY MAY, PROPORTIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2014).
2.
See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack,
CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/vi1rulrulel4
(last visited Feb. 22, 2018) [https://perma.cc/4NJV-QX86] (archived Feb. 2, 2018);
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS
471 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN
MANUAL 2.0].
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3
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."
Despite its status as a fundamental norm of IHL, 4 neither
Additional Protocol I nor any other international treaty provides
definitions for key terms such as "may, be expected" or "military
advantage." This has caused challenges for both academics and
military commanders alike in explaining and applying the test for
proportionality. 5
Unfortunately, subsequent case law has not greatly assisted in the
interpretation of this test. In Prosecutor v. Kupregki6, the Trial
Chamber held the principle of proportionality requires that "any
incidental (and unintentional) damage to civilians must not be out of
proportion to the direct military advantage gained by the military
attack." 6 The Court was not required in that case to undertake a
detailed analysis. In Prosecutor v. Galid, the Trial Chamber held the
express prohibition of indiscriminate attacks in Additional Protocol I
7
is reflective of the customary law applicable in all conflicts.
Regrettably for commentators and practitioners, the Court did not
need to engage in further legal analysis before applying the test for
proportionality to the facts in that case.
Most recently in Prosecutorv. Prlid, the Trial Chamber found the
destruction of the Old Bridge of Mostar caused "indisputable and
substantial" damage to the civilian population by reducing the
available supply routes for food and medical supplies and thereby
resulting in serious deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the
local area.8 Further, the destruction of the Old Bridge was said to have
"a very significant psychological impact" on the Muslim population of
Mostar.9 The Court then held this harm to the civilian population "was
disproportionate to the concrete and direct military advantage
expected by the destruction of the Old Bridge."1 0 With great respect,
the Court's conclusion was wrongly drawn.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
3.
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 51(5)(b),
57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol 1].
See Prosecutor v. Kupregki6 et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, T 524
4.
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000) [hereinafter Kupreikid]
("Articles 57 and 58 of the First Additional Protocol of 1977 ... are not part of customary
international law[.]").
5.

See,

for example,

MATTHEW WAXMAN,

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

THE

POLITICS OF URBAN AIR OPERATIONS 8 n.14 (2000) ("[The] principle['s] . . . precise
meaning remains elusive, in part because of the inherent difficulties in measuring, and
then weighing, expected military gain and civilian harm.").
6.
Kupregki6, supra note 4.
See Prosecutor v. Gali6, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, TT 577.
58 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Galir].
Prosecutor v. Prlid, Case No. IT-04-74-T, Judgment, Vol. 3 TT 1583-1584
8.
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 29, 2013) [hereinafter Prli6 Trial
Chamber Vol. 3].
9.
Id. ¶ 1583.
Id. ¶ 1584.
10.
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First, the test for proportionality requires consideration only of
expected civilian deaths and injuries and damage to civilian objects.
Other intangible effects on the civilian population, such as
inconvenience, irritation, stress, or fear are not factored into collateral
damage." Accordingly, consideration of the inconvenience of being
required to use alternate supply routes or the stress of observing the
Old Bridge being destroyed resulted in an incorrect application of the
proportionality test in Prli6.
Second, while a deterioration of the humanitarian situation may
result in civilian deaths and injuries, that was not identified in the
Court's reasoning. 12
And finally, the Court did not appear to truly engage with
evaluating the anticipated military advantage and the expected
collateral damage. At paragraph 1582, the Court said "the Old Bridge
was essential to the ABiH [Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina] for
combat activities of its units on the front line" and "its destruction cut
off practically all possibilities for the ABiH to continue its supply
operations."1 3 Having made only general comments about harm to the
civilian population, and having made quite strong findings about the
military importance of the bridge, the Court simply said:
The Chamber therefore holds that although the destruction of the Old Bridge by
the HVO may have been justified by military necessity, the damage to the
civilian population was indisputable and substantial. It therefore holds by a
majority, with Judge Antonetti dissenting, that the impact on the Muslim
civilian population of Mostar was disproportionate to the concrete and direct
military advantage expected by the destruction of the Old Bridge.14

With respect, the anticipated collateral damage identified by the
Court was not so obviously out of all proportion to the anticipated
military advantage identified by the court so as to warrant such a
perfunctory analysis.
Three of the six accused appealed their conviction with respect to
the destruction of the Old Bridge on, inter alia, grounds related to the
5
Trial Chamber's findings that the destruction was disproportionate.'
Unfortunately for current purposes, the Appeals Chamber found it did

11.
See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL 261 (Dec. 2016) [hereinafter
DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL] ("Mere inconveniences or temporary disruptions to civilian
life need not be considered in applying this rule."); MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 96 (2009); TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note

2, at 472.
12.
There is no significant elaboration on this point in Volume 2 of the Court's
decision concerning 'Factual Findings Regarding Crimes Committed in Municipalities
and Detention Centres'. See generally Prosecutor v. Prli6, Case No. IT-04-74-T,
Judgment, Vol. 2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 29, 2013).
13.
Prli6 Trial Chamber Vol. 3, supra note 8, T 1582.
Id. ¶ 1584.
14.
15.
See Prosecutor v. Prlik, Case No. IT-04-74-A, Judgment, Vol. 1 ¶¶ 407-08
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2017) [hereinafter Prlid Appeal].
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not have to address any of the proportionality arguments raised by
Stojid, Praljak, and Petkovi6. Rather, the Appeals Chamber upheld this
aspect of the appeal on the following basis:
The Appeals Chamber recalls that the elements of wanton destruction not
justified by military necessity, as a violation of the laws or customs of war,
include, inter alia, the destruction of property that occurs on a large scale and
that the destruction is not justified by military necessity. Since the Trial
Chamber found that the Old Bridge was a military target at the time of the
attack, and, thus, its destruction offered a definite military advantage, the
Appeals Chamber, Judge Pocar dissenting, finds that it cannot be considered, in
16
and of itself, as wanton destruction not justified by military necessity.

An explanation of the application of the proportionality test in
state practice, evidenced namely in the armed forces' manuals on the
law of armed conflict, is also scarce. Most of these military manuals
simply recite the law but provide limited discussion on the practical
application of the test. An exception appears to be the United States
Department of Defense (US DoD) Law of War Manual, which provides
a detailed analysis of the prohibition on attacks expected to cause
17
excessive incidental harm.
In the absence of clarity on the application of the proportionality
test, we will consider two issues which require immediate attention in
light of current military operations. First, noting the test is not
mechanical but requires an assessment of disparate values (i.e.,
expected incidental harm and anticipated military advantage), what is
the standard for assessing proportionality? We will contend it is that
of the "reasonable military commander."
Second, should "reverberating effects" or "indirect effects" be
accounted for as part of the assessment of collateral damage? We will
contend that reverberating or indirect effects are counted as part of the
collateral damage assessment but only where that harm will arise as
an expected consequence of the attack. While there is no definitive
temporal or geographical limitation, any incidental harm to civilians
or damage to civilian objects that is too remote to have been reasonably
caused by the attack or is but a mere possibility does not form part of
the assessment.

II. THE "REASONABLE MILITARY COMMANDER" STANDARD
What does the "reasonable military commander" standard for
assessing proportionality entail?
This was the opening question to the panel and set the parameters
for the discussion that followed. Of course, as was no doubt well known

16.
17.

Id. ¶ 411 (internal citations omitted).
See DoD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11,

¶¶

5.12-5.12.3.4.

840

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATION'AL LAW

[VOL. 51:835

by the very experienced panel moderator,1 8 a whole workshop could be
dedicated to this question alone. What follows addresses why the
''reasonable military commander" was adopted as the standard against
which the ensuing discussion was conducted.
The first point to note is that the codified principle of
proportionality in Additional Protocol I, article 57(2)(a)(iii), does not
refer to a "reasonable military commander" at all. The obligation to
comply with the principle of proportionality lies with either "those who
plan or decide upon an attack,"' 9 or those who execute an attack.2 0 The
reference to a "reasonable military commander" does not describe who
has the obligation, but rather the standard against which a decision on
proportionality is to be made or judged. Determining the standard
against which proportionality decisions are to be evaluated is
important because:
[C]enturies of discussion by philosophers and jurists about the meanings of
necessity and proportionality in human affairs do not seem to have produced
general definitions capable of answering concrete issues. As with many abstract
concepts, the answers to specific questions depend on the circumstances,
appraised in the light of the humanitarian ends that justify the restraints.
Determining the proper relation between means and ends in situations of great
complexity and uncertainty is never easy. Decision makers are faced with their
own inadequacies and lack of knowledge, together with the pressures inherent
in conflict. They cannot forget the risks and costs of restraint, yet they must also
be mindful of the legal imperative to avoid unnecessary and disproportionate
21
force.

As the proportionality decision requires an assessment, it is
imperative to understand whether the assessment is subjective (e.g.,
"where a person believes"), objective but unqualified (e.g., "where a
person reasonably believes"), or objective but qualified (e.g., "where a
doctor reasonably believes"). By way of a short bit of history, it would
seem that the term "reasonable military commander" owes its genesis
to the Final Report to the Prosecutorby the Committee Established to
Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of

18.
See
Michael
A.
Newton,
VANDERBILT
LAW
SCHOOL,
https://law.vanderbilt.edubiolmichael-newton
(last
visited
Feb.
22,
2018)
[https://perma.cc/3T7F-LP9D] (archived Feb. 14, 2018).
19.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 57(2)(a).
20.
Id. art. 57(2)(b). Note that art. 57(2)(b) does not directly refer to those who
"execute" an attack, but it seems clear that, along with those who plan or decide upon an
attack, it is primarily those who executed attack who would be in a position to comply
with this requirement. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE
Bruno Zimmermann
PROTOCOLS].

21.

eds.,

1987)

¶

2220 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski

[hereinafter

&

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977

COMMENTARY

ON THE ADDITIONAL

Oscar Schachter, Remarks, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 39, 39 (1992).
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Yugoslavia.22 It is worth extracting the relevant paragraphs from the
report in full:
49. The questions which remain unresolved once one decides to apply the
principle of proportionality include the following:
a) What are the relative values to be assigned to the military advantage gained
and the injury to non-combatants and/or the damage to civilian objects?
b) What do you include or exclude in totalling your sums?
c) What is the standard of measurement in time or space? and
d) To what extent is a military commander obligated to expose his own forces to
danger in order to limit civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects?
50. The answers to these questions are not simple. It may be necessary to resolve
them on a case by case basis, and the answers may differ depending on the
background and values of the decision maker. It is unlikely that a human rights
lawyer and an experienced combat commander would assign the same relative
values to military advantage and to injury to noncombatants. Further, it is
unlikely that military commanders with different doctrinal backgrounds and
differing degrees of combat experience or national military histories would
always agree in close cases. It is suggested that the determination of relative
values must be that of the "reasonable military commander". Although
there will be room for argument in close cases, there will be many cases where
reasonable military commanders will agree that the injury to noncombatants or
the damage to civilian objects was clearly disproportionate to the military
advantage gained.

23

As can be seen, it was a quite deliberate decision to not adopt a
"reasonable person" standard but rather a "reasonable military
commander" standard. Subsequently there has been some, albeit
limited, judicial attention to the issue of the standard to be applied
when making proportionality decisions.

At the international level, in Gali6 the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) held that:
One type of indiscriminate attack violates the principle of proportionality....
The basic obligation to spare civilians and civilian objects as much as possible
must guide the attacking party when considering the proportionality of an
attack. In determining whether an attack was proportionate it is necessary to
examine whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances

Office of the Prosecutor, InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the Former
22.
Yugoslavia (ICTY): Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to
Review the NATO Bombing CampaignAgainst the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1257 (2000) [hereinafter Final Report of the NATO Bombing
Campaign]; see also Robert D. Sloane, Puzzles of Proportionand the "ReasonableMilitary
Commander"- Reflections on the Law, Ethics, and Geopolitics of Proportionality,6 HARV.
NAT'L SEC. J. 299, 302 (2015).
Final Report of the NATO Bombing Campaign, supra note 22, TT 49-50
23.
(emphasis added).
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of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available
to him or her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the
24
attack.

The ICTY in Gali6 was not called upon to actually decide on an issue
concerning the proportionality of an attack; rather, the Tribunal was
setting out general principles. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Tribunal
was of the view that the standard is that of "a reasonably well-informed
person in the circumstances of the actual [original decision-maker]."
There are two other ICTY cases that often arise in discussion
about proportionality. As mentioned above, in Prli6the ICTY reviewed
an attack on the Old Bridge in Mostar and said:
The Chamber therefore holds that although the destruction of the Old Bridge by
the HVO may have been justified by military necessity, the damage to the
civilian population was indisputable and substantial. It therefore holds by a
majority, with Judge Antonetti dissenting, that the impact on the Muslim
civilian population of Mostar was disproportionate to the concrete and direct
25
military advantage expected by the destruction of the Old Bridge.

Putting to one side for current purposes other discussion that
might be made on the factors the Trial Chamber took into account in
considering what amounted to civilian harm, the relevant point for this
Part of the Article is that the Trial Chamber did not identify what
standard was being used when determining that the attack was
disproportionate. In his dissent, Judge Antonetti was of the view that
proportionality did not apply to the attack, 26 so the question of what
standard to apply did not arise.
Finally, while the ICTY briefly discussed the principle of
proportionality in Kupreskic,2 7 there was no discussion of the standard
to be applied.
There are also two decisions of a domestic court that are of
interest. The Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court, has
on at least two occasions made reference to the "reasonable military
commander." The first was in The Beit Sourik Village Council v. The
Government of Israel where President Barak referred to a "reasonable
military commander" in the context of proportionality, although in that
case the issue was not under the law of targeting but rather the law of

24.
Galid, supra note 7, T 58 (emphasis added).
25.
Prli6 Trial Chamber Vol. 3, supra note 8, T 1584.
26.
Prosecutor v. Prli6, Case No. IT-04-74-T, Separate and Partially Dissenting
Opinion of Presiding Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti, Vol. 6, at 325 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia May 29, 2013).
27.
See Kupregki6, supra note 4, IT 524-26 (saying that the provision of
proportionality is typically applied in conjunction with the principle that the military
must take reasonable care to not injure civilians).
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occupation and administrative decision making. 28 At paragraph 46,
President Barak held:
The first question deals with the military character of the route. It examines
whether the route chosen by the military commander for the separation fence
achieves its stated objectives, and whether there is no route which achieves this
objective better. It raises problems within the realm of military expertise. We,
Justices of the Supreme Court, are not experts in military affairs. We shall not
examine whether the military commander's military opinion corresponds to
ours-to the extent that we have an opinion regarding the military character of
the route. So we act in all questions which are matters of professional expertise,
and so we act in military affairs as well. All we can determine is whether a
reasonable military commander would have set out the route as this
military commander did. President Shamgar dealt with this idea, noting:
It is obvious, that a court cannot "slip into the shoes" of the deciding military
official. . . . In order to substitute the discretion of the commander with the
discretion of the Court, we examine the question whether, in light of all of the
29
facts, the employment of the means can be viewed as reasonable.

President Barak then continued:
30
Similarly, in Ajuri ' I wrote:

The Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, reviews the legality
of the military commander's discretion. Our point of departure is that the
military commander, and those who obey his orders, are civil servants holding
public positions. In exercising judicial review, we do not turn ourselves into
experts in security affairs. We do not substitute the security considerations of
the military commander with our own security considerations. We take no
position regarding the way security affairs are run. Our task is to guard the
borders

and to maintain

the

boundaries

of the

military

commander's

discretion. . . . It is true, that "the security of the state" is not a "magic word"
which makes judicial review disappear. Thus, we shall not be deterred from
reviewing the decisions of the military commander . . . simply because of the
important security considerations anchoring his decision. However, we shall

not substitute the discretion of the commander with our own discretion. We
shall check the legality of the discretion of the military commander and ensure
31
that his decisions fall within the "zone of reasonableness."

The second case is Public Committee against Torture in Israel v
Government of Israel,3 2 in which President Barak referred to the
"reasonable military commander" in the context of determining

HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Israel, 58(5) PD 817, ¶ 46
28.
(2004) (Isr.) [hereinafter Beit Sourik].
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
29.
See generally HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank
30.
(unreported) (2002) (Isr.).
Beit Sourik, supra note 28, ¶ 46 (emphasis added) (internal citations
31.
omitted).
HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of Israel 62(1) PD
32.
507 (2006) (Isr.), reprintedin 46 I.L.M. 375 [hereinafter Public Committee v. Israel].
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whether a person was a lawful target under IHL. At page 57, President
Barak said:
At the other end of the spectrum of possibilities lies the professional-military
decision to carry out a preventative operation which causes the deaths of
terrorists in the territories. This is a decision that falls within the authority of
the executive branch. It has the professional security expertise in this sphere.
The court will ask itself whether a reasonable military commander would
have made the decision that was actually made.... It is true that "military
considerations" and "state security" are not magic words that prevent judicial
scrutiny. But the question is not what I would have decided in the given
circumstances, but whether the decision that the military commander made is a
33
decision that a reasonable military commander was entitled to make.

Interestingly, Barak goes on to say at paragraph 58:
The decision on a question whether the benefit that accrues from the
preventative attack is commensurate with the collateral damage caused to
innocent civilians who are harmed by it is a legal question, with regard to which
it is the judiciary that have the expertise.

Compare this to decision of Rivlin V-P, where at paragraph 6 he said:
The principle of proportionality is easy 'to state, but hard to implement. When
we consider it prospectively, under time constraints and on the basis of limited
sources of information, the decision may be a difficult and complex' one.
Frequently it is necessary to consider values and principles that cannot be easily
balanced. Each of the competing considerations is based upon relative variables.
None of them can be considered as standing on its own. Proportionate military
needs include humanitarian elements. Humanitarian considerations take into
account existential military needs. As my colleague the president says, the court
determines the law that governs the decision of the military commander. The
professional military decision is the responsibility of the executive branch, and
the court will ask itself if a reasonable military commander could have
made the decision that was actually made, in view of the normative
principles that apply to the case. (cf. Final Report to the Prosecutor to the
Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was submitted to
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in June 2000).34

When one reads the decision of President Barak in The Public
Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel in its
entirety, along with his previous decision in The Beit Sourik Village
Council v. The Government of Israel, it is a logical interpretation of his
decision to conclude that his honor was making three points. The first
point is that decisions of military commanders are justiciable. Second,
it is for the court to determine, and authoritatively interpret, the law.
Finally, when conducting judicial review against the requisite legal

33.
34.

Id.
Id.

¶
¶

57, at 512 (emphasis added).
6, at 526.
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obligation, the standard to be applied is that of a "reasonable military
commander." This is in essence what Rivlin V-P held.
Noting that the Tribunal in Gali6 was dealing with general
principles and, in a judgment running to 770 paragraphs (exclusive of
annexes), dedicated one paragraph to explain the principle of
proportionality,3 5 we submit that the test set out by the Israeli
Supreme Court is more persuasive-namely, that a person who plans,
decides, or executes an attack must consider the proportionality of the
attack; and in so doing, the standard to be applied, particularly on
review, is that of the "reasonable military commander." First,
determining the requisite standard was clearly a matter of some
importance in the two Israeli Supreme Court judgments. Second, this
standard has been used in publications as diverse as the
aforementioned 2000 ICTY Final Report to the Prosecutor,36 a 2014
International Law Association Study Group report,3 7 a 2016 Human
Rights Watch report,3 8 and the 2016 US DoD Law of War Manual.3 9 It
speaks volumes for the usefulness of the term "reasonable military
commander" that practitioners, academics, NGOs, and militaries can
agree on the same standard.
Third, it is military commanders who are most likely, by dint of
training and experience, to be able to foresee and assess both the
anticipated military advantage and the expected collateral damage
from the attack. As Colonel Fred Green, the then Counsel to the
Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, said when discussing the
targeting practices adopted by the United States during the 1990-91
Gulf War: "The various mechanisms I have described are employed by
commanders and planners who have been educated and trained
throughout their military careers in our professional military schools.
They practice this kind of decision making during their training
courses and in all military exercises." 40
This is not to say that a nonmilitary person could not make the
proportionality decision. What it is saying is that the standard against
which that decision is to be evaluated is that of a person with all the
experience, training, and understanding of military operations that is

See Gali6, supra note 7, ¶ 58. This comment is not meant as a criticism of
35.
the Tribunal. In the context of the matter before the Tribunal, we agree, with respect,
that one paragraph is all that was warranted.
See Final Report of the NATO Bombing Campaign, supranote 22, T 50.
36.
See generally TERRY GILL ET AL., INT'L LAW ASSoC. STUDY GRP. ON THE
37.
CONDUCT OF HOSTITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: CHALLENGES OF 21ST CENTURY WARFAREINTERIM REPORT (2014).
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, MAKING
38.
THE CASE: THE DANGERS OF KILLER ROBOTS AND THE NEED FOR A PREEMPTIVE BAN 6

(2016).
DoD LAw OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 5.10.2.2.
39.
40.
Fred K. Green, Remarks, Proportionality and Necessity in American
National Security Decision Making, 86 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 39, 64 (1992).
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vested in a "reasonable military commander." One consequence of this
is that nonmilitary considerations, such as the political or diplomatic
consequences of whether a particular attack did or did not occur, or
that a certain amount of collateral damage was caused, are not
relevant to the IHL assessment of whether the attack is proportional.
Such factors can, of course, be taken into account in deciding whether
or not a particular attack that is otherwise lawful will occur, but they
do not affect the assessment of whether the attack would be
proportional. 41
Noting the importance in many states of civil control of the
military, the role for senior (civilian) government figures in making a
final decision on whether an attack with expected collateral damage
could be appropriately accommodated through a well-worded brief
that:
a.
b.
c.
d.

identifies the target;
outlines the anticipated military advantage and expected
collateral damage;
indicates that a relevant military commander has determined
that as a matter of IHL the attack would be proportional; and
requests advice on whether the attack is, for other non-IHL
reasons, approved or not approved.

Of course, under this model, a brief would never seek a decision from a
senior civilian government official on whether a target was approved
for attack or not unless a military commander had determined that as
a matter of IHL the attack would be proportional. If the attack is
assessed as not being proportional, that is the end of the matter. 42
We now turn to the second Part of this Article: Should
"reverberating effects" (i.e., collateral effects that are only expected to
materialize in the long term) be accounted for as part of the assessment
of collateral damage?

III. REVERBERATING EFFECTS
To enable a military commander to make a good-faith assessment
of the proportionality of an attack, the commander is first required to
calculate two things: (1) the anticipated military advantage of the
attack, and (2) the expected collateral damage. It is only once in

41.
See Luke Whittemore, Proportionality Decision Making in Targeting:
Heuristics, Cognitive Biases, and the Law, 7 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 577 (2016) (discussing
how actual proportionality decision making may occur).
42.
A Noting Brief might be provided if desired to keep relevant ministers,
secretaries, etc. apprised of targeting decisions made inside the military that did not
require a decision from a minister, secretary, etc.
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possession of those two calculations (or assessments) that the military
commander can then proceed to determine if the expected collateral
damage is excessive when compared to the anticipated military
advantage.
Clearly, calculating the expected collateral damage is crucial to
the proportionality assessment. But what, in fact, is accounted for on
this side of the ledger? Incidental civilian deaths and injuries and the
damage to civilian objects directly arising from the attack are clearly
captured within this calculation. For example, where civilian
causalities are expected within the blast area of a high explosive
weapon released on an enemy command headquarters, those civilians
form part of the calculation for expected collateral damage.
However, the interconnectedness of military and civilian
infrastructure or the close or overlapping proximity of military
objectives to the civilian population may give rise to situations where
attacks cause what have been termed "reverberating," "knock-on," or
"indirect" effects. Indirect effects are those effects that do not
immediately materialize from the kinetic/non-kinetic force of an
attack. Rather, indirect effects are often delayed by hours, days, weeks,
months, or even years following the attack and can be geographically
widespread. Are military commanders also under a legal obligation to
take into account the indirect effects when calculating the expected
collateral damage arising from the attack?
First, some consistency in use and understanding of terminology
will assist in answering this question. Eric Talbot Jensen, like the
authors of the Tallinn Manual 2.0, adopts the doctrinal definitions
used in the United States.4 3 These are as follows:
Direct effects are the immediate, first-order consequences of a military action
(weapons employment
mechanisms.

results,

etc.),

unaltered

by intervening

events

or

Indirect effects are the delayed and/or displaced second-, third-, and higherorder consequences of action, created through intermediate events or
mechanisms.

44

In the last few years, the issue of accounting for indirect effects on
civilians and civilian objects has been chiefly explored in relation to
attacks in cyberspace and outer space given the interconnectedness of

43.
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 2, at Rule 113, ¶ 6; Eric Talbot Jensen,
Cyber Attacks: Proportionalityand Precautions in Attack, 89 INTL L. STUD. 198, 207
(2013).
44.

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT TARGETING

T 11-35

(2013). Note

that the citations in Jensen and the Tallinn Manual are to the 2007 edition of this
publication (CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT TARGETING

T

1-10 (2007)).
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military and civilian infrastructure in these domains. 45 However,
recent military campaigns waged in cities populated by both fighters
and innocent civilians have again sensitized the international
community to the reverberation of military operations on the civilian
population. 46 We say "again," as this is not a new issue. For example,
in 1992 Frits Kalshoven said:
The other aspect concerns the long-term effects of war. In the specific case of
Operation Desert Storm, the assertion is frequently heard that the totality of the
attacks on military objectives in and around Baghdad has resulted in
considerable effects on the conditions of life that persist or even emerge long after
termination of the hostilities. The question is whether military planners could
and should have included such potential aftereffects in their calculations, to the
point of modifying their plans so as to avoid them?
It would be wonderful if the law provided an affirmative answer to this
question, but I am not convinced that it does so. For one thing, the case is not
one of straightforward causation of damage for which the attacker can be held
responsible. Furthermore, and more importantly, modern warfare must be
expected to cause considerable disruption of societal life in any developed society.
In this light it appears highly unlikely that the law of armed conflict could
require a belligerent to refrain from pursuing legitimate war aims with the
legitimate means at its disposal and against legitimate military objectives,
simply in order to avoid such adverse aftereffects. 4 7

Of course, reverberating effects come in many forms, and some are
more likely to be legally significant than others. By way of example,
the UK Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict refers to a planned
precision bombing attack on a military fuel storage depot, with a
foreseeable risk that burning fuel will flow into a civilian residential
area and cause injury to the civilian population. 48 The UK Manual says
this indirect (or second-order) effect would have to be counted as part
of the expected collateral damage.
Returning to the example of the attack on a command
headquarters, now consider if that same high explosive weapon is also
likely to damage critical water infrastructure located in the ground
below the headquarters, which is expected to interrupt supply of clean
water for drinking and sanitation to the city. Assume that the lack of
clean water is likely to significantly increase the risk of various

45.
See, e.g., Eric Boylan, Note, Applying the Law of Proportionalityto Cyber
Conflict: Suggestions for Practitioners,50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 217, 232 (2017); Eric
Talbot Jensen, Unexpected Consequences from Knock-On Effects: A Different Standard
for Computer Network Operations?, 18 AM. U. INVL L. REV. 1145, 1174-75 (2003).
46.
Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century
Warfare, 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. J. 143, 168 (1999).
47.
Frits Kalshoven, Implementing Limitations on the Use ofForce: The Doctrine
of Proportionalityand Necessity, 86 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 39, 45 (1992).
48.
UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 5.33.4 (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT].
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diseases such as cholera, diarrhea, dysentery, hepatitis A, typhoid, and
polio. 49 While the destruction of the water infrastructure would be a
direct (first-order) effect of the attack, and the resulting loss of access
to clean water an indirect (second-order) effect, does the law of armed
conflict require the reasonable military commander to consider, as part
of their calculation of expected collateral damage, the indirect (thirdand fourth-order) effects (i.e., the increased risk of disease and
resulting ill-health and deaths) on the civilian population as a
consequence of the interrupted water supply?
When one of the authors surveyed the literature in 2009, it could
not even be said with confidence that second-order effects would have
to be considered.5 0 At that time, the most that could be said was:
Some disagreement exists with respect to how to calculate adverse civilian
effects of attacks on military targets. One view holds that planners must consider
the long term, indirect effects of attacks on a civilian population, whereas the
U.S. military adheres to a narrower interpretation emphasizing direct civilian
51
injuries or deaths.

And the 2010 Commentary to the Manual on International Law
Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare states:
The members of the Group of Experts could not agree as to what extent (if at all)
indirect ("reverberating") effects of attacks have to be factored into the
proportionality calculation. In any event, there is no dispute that indirect effects
cannot be taken into account if they are too remote or cannot be reasonably
foreseen. The Group of Experts could identify no conclusive State practice that
52
settles the issue of indirect effects of attacks.

Jump forward to today and only a few commentators argue that
collateral damage is limited to death, injury, or damage caused directly
by the first-order effects of the means employed in the attack (e.g., by
the blast and fragmentation from a bomb). And the authors are not
aware of any states that so argue. To give but a few examples, we have
already seen that the United Kingdom would include, at least, secondorder effects.5 3 So would the United States. The US DoD Law of War
Manual at one point says:

49.

See

generally

WORLD

HEALTH

ORG.,

(last
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs391/en/
[https://perma.cclKZ9A-APX3] (archived Feb. 7, 2018).

Drinking-water,

updated

July

2017)

See IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAw OF TARGETING: MILITARY
50.
OBJECTIVES, PROPORTIONALITY AND PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK UNDER ADDITIONAL

PROTOCOL I 207-11 (2009).
WAXMAN, supra note 5, at 21 n.44.
51.
PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD
52.
UNIV., Commentary on the HPCR Manual on InternationalLaw Applicable to Air and
Missile Warfare, in HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAw APPLICABLE TO AIR AND

MISSILE WARFARE, at Rule 14, T 4 (2010).
53.

UK MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 48, T 5.33.4.

850

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 51:835

The expected loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects
is generally understood to mean such immediate or direct harms foreseeably
resulting from the attack. Remote harms that could result from the attack do not
54
need to be considered in applying this prohibition.

However, subsequent examples make it clear that the United
States does consider effects other than first-order effects that are the
caused directly by the means employed in the attack. As examples of
death and injury that would be counted, the US DoD Law of War
Manual refers to:
[If the destruction of a power plant would be expected to cause the loss of civilian
life or injury to civilians very soon after the attack due to the loss of power at a
connected hospital, then such harm should be considered in assessing whether
an attack is expected to cause excessive harm. 5 5

And on a section dealing with attacks on facilities containing
dangerous forces:
In light of the increased potential magnitude of incidental harm, additional
precautions, such as weaponeering or timing the attack such that weather
conditions would minimize dispersion of dangerous materials, may be
appropriate to reduce the risk that the release of these dangerous forces may
pose to the civilian population. 5 6

And in the most recent of the "expert" manuals dealing with,
among other things, IHL issues, there is the statement that "[t]he
collateral damage considered in the proportionality calculation
includes any indirect effects that should be expected by those
individuals planning, approving, or executing an attack."5 7
So while a strong argument can be made that military
commanders are under a legal obligation to consider the indirect effects
of an attack when calculating the expected collateral damage as part
of the proportionality assessment, there is no apparent consensus as to
the scope of this obligation. Are all indirect effects (second-, third-, and
higher-order) to be considered? Or are some effects so remote (e.g.,
third- or higher-order) that they should be disregarded in the
proportionality assessment?
In determining whether there is a legal obligation to take into
account the indirect effects of an attack, we can start with the relevant
provisions of Additional Protocol I as being a codification of the test for
proportionality in both international and non-international armed
conflict.58 As a general rule of treaty interpretation, these provisions

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 5.12.1.3.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5.13.
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 2, at Rule 113, ¶ 6.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b).

2018J7

THE "REASONABLE MILITARY COMMANDER" STANDARD

851

are to be interpreted in good faith and the ordinary meaning is to be
given to the terms in the context in which they appear.59 The key
phrase is "may be expected to cause." The ordinary meaning of expect
is to "regard (something) as likely to happen"60 or "to consider probable
or certain."6 1
However, a literal approach to interpretation of "may be expected
to cause" does not clarify whether expected collateral damage is limited
to the direct effects of an attack, or whether the proportionality
assessment should also include the indirect effects; and if so, of what
order? There is scope for competing arguments. 62 The authors are
unaware of any authoritative case law on point. 63
As the US DoD Law of War Manual is one of the few military
manuals to actually grapple with the issue, it is unfortunate, therefore,
that the examples of two types of remote harm that the Manual says
need not be considered are actually examples of consequences that are
not collateral damage in the first place. The examples given are
economic harm to a family caused by death of a family member who is
a combatant, and loss of jobs caused by destruction of a tank factory. 64
Neither economic harm nor loss of employment are considered
collateral damage at IHL. A more interesting example would have been
the death of a child from malnutrition and lack of access to costly
medical care because of the economic harm or loss of a parent's
employment.
Clarity may be ascertained by considering these treaty provisions
in light of the object and purpose of Additional Protocol I.65 The
preamble to the Protocol states that it is the High Contracting Parties'

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155
59.
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶ 41 (Feb. 3).
60.

Expect, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https:/en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/

expect (last visited Feb. 22, 2018) [https://perma.ccIY6G8-EA4T] (archived Feb. 7, 2018).
61.

Expected,

MERRIAM-WEBSTER

webster.com/dictionary/expected
EXSQ] (archived Feb. 7, 2018).

DICTIONARY,

https://www.merriam-

(last visited Feb. 22, 2018) [https://perma.cc/55Z7-

YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
62.
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 159 (3d ed. 2016) ("the only consequences that count

&

are those that occur directly: remote effects need not be counted"); cf Isabel Robinson
Ellen Nohle, Proportionalityand Precautionsin Attack: The Reverberating Effects of
Using Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, 98(1) INT'L REV. RED CROSS 107, 116
(2016) ("[I]ncidental damage is not limited to the direct effects of an attack but
encompasses certain reverberating effects, which must be taken into account when
assessing the lawfulness of an attack.").
While the issue was raised specifically by Stoji6 in his appeal (he submitted
63.
that "the Trial Chamber erred in basing its finding that the destruction was
disproportionate entirely on indirect effects, particularly the long-term harm through
isolation and the psychological impact on the civilian population."), as noted above, the
Appeals Chamber upheld the appeal on a different ground and did not need to address
this submission. Prlid Appeal, supra note 15, $ 407.
DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 5.12.1.3.
64.
65.

Vienna Convention, supra note 59, art. 31.
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belief that it is necessary to "reaffirm and develop the provisions
protecting the victims Of armed conflicts."66 Additionally, articles 51
and 57 are contained in Part IV titled Civilian Population, within
section I titled "General protection against the effects of hostilities." 67
Within the context of the treaty, the aim of these provisions is to
provide civilians with an expansive protection against the effects of
attacks in an armed conflict. 68 Accordingly, a purposive approach to
these provisions supports an interpretation that provides "the broadest
protection to civilians, including by requiring that commanders take
into account the reverberation effect of an attack."6 9
Following an interpretation of the relevant provisions of
Additional Protocol I in light of the object and purpose of the treaty, it
appears that military commanders are under a legal obligation to take
into account both the direct and indirect effects of the attack when
assessing the proportionality of the attack. That said, any indirect
harm should only be taken into account when such harm is an expected
consequence of the attack. Further, there appears to be no consensus
as to whether there is a limit in accounting for indirect effects in the
proportionality assessment.
Having contended that military commanders are under a legal
obligation to take into account the expected indirect effects of an
attack, we now turn to consider the content of this obligation. Are all
possible indirect effects (second-, third-, and higher-order) to be taken
into account? Or are some effects (e.g., third- or higher-order) too
remote to be excluded from the calculation? For example, if an attack
on a target is likely to cause damage to a nearby civilian fire brigade
stationhouse, should the foreseeable potential of increased risk to
buildings by fire . be counted during the proportionality assessment
during the planning of the attack?
It is clear from the text of the relevant provisions of Additional
Protocol I that only collateral damage that is expected must be
accounted for .in the proportionality assessment. 70 Incidental harm
that is not likely, probable, or certain, and therefore is only a mere
possibility, is excluded from the proportionality equation.
This is further supported by the travaux prdparatoires for
Additional Protocol I. Committee discussions reveal consideration was
given to inserting the words "which risks causing" incidental harm,
which would have required commanders to account for all possibilities
of resulting collateral damage." However, the final adoption of the
words "which may be expected to cause" indicate the intention of the

10.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, Preamble.
Id. arts. 51, 57.
See id.
Robinson & Nohle, supra note 62, at 114.
See Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b).

71.

See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 20,

¶¶

2209-
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parties to exclude from the proportionality assessment those collateral
72
damage effects that are speculative.
To illustrate the distinction between collateral damage that can
be expected and collateral damage that is merely speculative, recall
our earlier example of the incidental destruction of critical water
infrastructure. Any physical damage to the water infrastructure is a
direct effect of the attack and, if the infrastructure was classed as a
civilian object, the expected damage would be included in
proportionality calculations.73 Regardless of whether the water
infrastructure is a civilian object or a military objective, the resulting
destruction has the potential to indirectly affect the civilian
population. The military commander must consider the indirect effects
on the city's civilian population caused by the attack-that is, the
death and injury to civilians as a consequence of interrupted water
supply. However, only expected civilian deaths or injuries are
accounted for in the proportionality assessment.
If there is information available to the military commander that
suggests that civilians have access to sufficient supplies of bottled
water while the damage to the water infrastructure is repaired, then
the commander would not expect any indirect harm to the civilian
population. Indirect harm is excluded from the proportionality
assessment where one can reasonably expect such harm can be avoided
as a result of remedial action.
However, the commander has further information that suggests
that this bottled water cannot be successfully distributed to
approximately 10 percent of the city's civilian population. With no
water supply, it is likely some of these civilians would die of thirst in
the coming weeks.
There is now scope for two possible views. One view could be that
these deaths are an expected result of the attack, regardless of the
anticipated timeframe for those deaths to eventuate. Accordingly, the
forecast number of casualties would be factored into any
proportionality assessment. The other view could be that this is
speculation. Perhaps the civilians will relocate. Perhaps humanitarian
aid will be provided. Perhaps the armed conflict will come to an end.
Perhaps it is the rainy season and rainwater can be harvested. So while
civilians dying of thirst in the coming weeks is possible, it is not
necessarily inevitable. But more so, it is not even confidently
predictable. Further, it might be avoided through possible remedial
action.
On the second view,, any risk of civilian casualties would be too
remote to be reasonably considered to have been caused by the attack.
Therefore, these deaths would not be considered expected indirect
harm as a consequence of the attack and would not be accounted for in

72.
73.

See Jensen, supra note 45, at 1180-81.
See Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 52(2).
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the proportionality assessment.
There is simply insufficient state practice and rulings by courts to
indicate which of these two options is the better view of the law.
However, it is the view of the authors that the second view makes more
sense. There are limits to what can reasonably be expected of
commanders while prosecuting an armed conflict. Notably, adopting
the second view would not leave civilians devoid of protection.
First, there is the simple rule that if military commanders expect
that indirect harm will eventuate as a result of the attack, that is
civilians are likely to be killed or injured, or that civilian objects are
likely to be damaged, then that expected collateral damage must be
factored into the proportionality assessment. Second, civilians would
also still remain under the protection afforded by Additional Protocol
I, article 54 and Additional Protocol II, article 14 concerning Protection
of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, and
the customary international law counterpart. 74

IV. CONCLUSION

Quite appropriately, IHL provides various protections for civilians
from the dangers inherent in armed conflict. The principal protection,
of course, is that of distinction. This is closely followed by the obligation
for attackers to take precautions in the planning and conduct of an
attack. But ultimately, IHL recognizes that even where all the
appropriate precautions are taken, there will be some circumstances
in which civilians and civilian objects remain in danger of incidental
harm from an attack. It is here where the principle of proportionality
provides one last protection. When an attack is planned against only a
legitimate military objective, and where all feasible precautions have
been taken in the choice of means and methods of attack to avoid, and
in any event to minimize, incidental harm to civilians and civilian
objects, the attack must nonetheless not proceed if the expected
incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects will be excessive to the
military advantage anticipated from the attack.
As the principle of proportionality allows, in effect, an attacker to
conduct an attack in the knowledge that civilians will be injured or
killed, and civilian objects damaged, the importance of a clear
understanding of the parameters of this principle cannot be overstated.

74.
Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Rule 54. Attacks against Objects Indispensable
to the Survival of the Civilian Population, CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE,
http://www.icre.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/vl-rulrule54 (last visited Feb. 22, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/8G8G-4KVTJ
(archived Feb. 7, 2018). For state practices
demonstrating that this is a principle, if not a positive rule, in international armed
conflicts, see DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶¶ 5.20.4, 19.20.1.4. The DoD
Law of War Manual seems to accept it as a rule in non-international armed conflicts. See
id. ¶¶ 17.9.2, 19.20.2.1.
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In this short Article we have addressed two issues, namely: what is the
standard for assessing proportionality; and whether reverberating or
indirect incidental injury or death to civilians, and damage to civilian
objects, need to be considered as part of the assessment of the expected
collateral damage.
Based on a review of case law, state practice, and learned
commentary, we concluded that the most appropriate standard for
assessing a decision on the proportionality of attack is that of a
"reasonable military commander." We suggested that this standard
has the advantage of having gained acceptance among practicing
lawyers, academics, NGOs, and militaries. It also focuses the attention
of the person making or reviewing an assessment of proportionality
that such an assessment requires an understanding of military
operations; while conversely, political or diplomatic consequences
should be disregarded when applying the legal test for proportionality.
Of course, that is not to say that these last two issues, or other issues
for that matter, are irrelevant to a decision to conduct an attack-they
are just irrelevant to the legal evaluation of the proportionality of an
attack.
The second issue we covered in this Article was what is considered
to be expected collateral damage; in particular, does it include
"reverberating," "knock-on," or "indirect" effects? After defining
indirect effects, we reviewed the text of Additional Protocol I and its
drafting history, the limited case law on this point, military manuals,
and expert commentary. We concluded that indirect effects do need to
be considered but with an important qualification.
To meet the legal threshold for collateral damage, the indirect
effects must be, as a minimum, more than speculative or a mere
possibility. To explore this point, we proceeded to consider how to deal
with indirect effects that may or may not eventuate in the days, weeks,
months, or years following an attack depending on variables such as
whether civilians would relocate from an area, whether humanitarian
aid would be provided, or even whether the armed conflict would come
to an end.
We were of the view that there is insufficient state practice and
case law to provide a confident view of what the law says about this
situation, but the authors believe that the view that makes the most
sense is that commanders cannot be reasonably expected to account for
indirect effects which one would expect might be avoided through
possible remedial action, or in any event, while possible, are neither
inevitable nor confidently predictable. We submit such harm is too
remote to be included as expected collateral damage. We note that if we
are correct about that, civilians are not left without protection from the
long-term effects of an attack due to the additional protection provided
under IHL to objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population.

